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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
We do not have the same sort of control over our doxastic attitudes—belief, disbelief, and 
suspension of belief—as we do over many ordinary actions. When offered a reward for 
performing an action, such as raising your hand or turning on the light, you can, at least in 
normal circumstance, just raise your hand or turn on the light and collect the reward. By 
contrast, when offered a reward for believing a proposition, such as that the US is still a colony 
of Britain or that Hell is a bar in Chapel Hill1, you cannot, at least not in normal circumstances, 
just believe that the U.S. is still a colony of Britain or that Hell is a bar in Chapel Hill and collect 
the reward. We can isolate this intuitive contrast in the following no rewards principle: 
(NRP) No matter how large the reward, S cannot simply decide to believe some 
proposition p in order to collect that reward. 
Because of this intuitive difference, philosophers such as Alston2 and Plantinga3 endorse 
doxastic involuntarism: 
 (DI) The formation of one’s beliefs is not within one’s direct voluntary control.4 
                                                
* For helpful feedback on previous versions of this paper, I would like to thank John Broome, Campbell 
Brown, Andy Clark, Graham Hubbs, Hilary Kornblith, Ram Neta, Duncan Pritchard, Michael Ridge, Jay 
Rosenberg, Russ Shafer-Landau, Piers Turner, and audiences at the University of Aberdeen and the 
University of Edinburgh. 
1 The first example is from W. Alston, "The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification," 
Philosophical Perspectives, 2 (1988): 257-299. I also include the second example because it illustrates 
that the issue is not whether you can voluntarily believe a false proposition in order to collect a reward but 
whether you can voluntarily believe a proposition for which you have countervailing evidence or even no 
evidence. 
2 See Ibid. and Beyond Justification: Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2005). 
3 See Warrant: The Current Debate (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
4 In “Deciding to Believe,” in Problems Of The Self: Philosophical Papers, 1956-1972 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 136-147, B. Williams endorsed the stronger principle that the 
formation of one’s beliefs cannot be within one’s voluntary control. He thought that this is an implication 
of the idea that “belief aim at truth”. There has been much discussion of what to make of this idea and the 
conclusion Williams draws from it. See especially J. Bennett, “Why is Belief Involuntary?” Analysis 50:2 
(1990): 87-107, D. Scott-Kakures “On Belief and the Captivity of the Will,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 54:4 (1993): 77-103, D. Radcliffe “Scott-Kakures on Believing at Will,” 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57:1 (1997): 145-151, D. Velleman “On the Aim of Belief,” 
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In this way, belief formation seems to be much more like digestion than ordinary actions such as 
raising one’s hand or turning on the lights.5 As with digestion, one may have indirect control 
over the formation of beliefs in that there are actions within one’s direct voluntary control that 
have foreseeable effects on what one believes. But, in both cases, we seem to lack the sort of 
control that we have over ordinary actions. 
 However, it also seems clear that many statements about what we ought to believe, 
disbelieve or suspend belief about are true. For example, you ought to believe that you are 
reading this paper right now. We can isolate this intuition in the following true doxastic oughts 
principle: 
 (DOP) At least some sentences of the form ‘S ought to believe p’ are true. 
Because of this intuitive idea, philosophers such as M. Steup6 and S. Ryan7 endorse what we 
might call epistemic deontology8: 
(ED) Beliefs are proper subjects of epistemic oughts.  
To many who are impressed by the idea that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, epistemic deontology has 
seemed to be in tension with doxastic involuntarism. This has led to a standoff between doxastic 
involuntarists and epistemic deontologists. Doxastic involuntarists argue that epistemic 
                                                                                                                                                       
The Possibility of Practical Reason (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press Oxford, 2000), N. Shah “How 
Truth Governs Belief,” The Philosophical Review, 112:4 (2003): 447-82, and N. Shah and D. Velleman 
“Doxastic Deliberation,” The Philosophical Review, 114, 4 (2005): 497-534. For my purposes here, 
however, the weaker form of doxastic involuntarism stated in the text is strong enough, and here I will 
remain neutral about its relation to the idea that belief aims at the truth. 
5 Raising one’s hand is an action over which we have what Alston refers to as “basic voluntary control” 
because it is something we can just do. Turning on the light is an action over which we have what Alston 
refers to as “nonbasic immediate voluntary control” because it is something we can do right away by doing 
something else (such as, flipping the switch). By in large, these details will not matter here, but it is worth 
mentioning that Alston claims that we have neither sort of voluntary control over our beliefs, although he 
allows that we have what he calls “nonbasic indirect voluntary control” of a very weak sort over our 
beliefs, comparable to the sort of control we have over our blood pressure. R. Feldman "The Ethics of 
Belief," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60:3 (2000): 667-695, argues that there are some 
beliefs over which we exercise nonbasic immediate voluntary control. His example is the belief that the 
lights are on in his office. If offered a high reward to believe this, he could collect the reward by turning on 
the lights in his office and thereby coming to have the belief right away. Alston might respond that this is 
indirect rather than direct nonbasic voluntary control, but I think the line between the two is vague. What 
is important here is that (as Feldman recognizes) the sort of voluntary control over beliefs that his 
example illustrates is something we have over only a small class of potential beliefs. Basically it is just the 
beliefs for which we have the power to make their propositional contents true. For the purposes of my 
discussion here, this class of beliefs may be bracketed, since the sorts of ordinary doxastic oughts that 
generate the tension between doxastic involuntarism and epistemic deontology far outstrips this class of 
beliefs. 
6 "Doxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontology" Acta Analytica, 15, 24 (2000): 25-56, and "Doxastic 
Freedom," Synthese, forthcoming. 
7 "Doxastic Compatibilism and the Ethics of Belief," Philosophical Studies, 114 (2003): 47-79. 
8 This is a perhaps somewhat restricted way to use the term ‘epistemic deontology’, which a comparison to 
ethical deontology reveals: ethical deontologists, consequentialists, and virtue theorists all agree that 
actions are proper subjects of ethical oughts; what they disagree about is the source or justification for 
these ethical oughts. So, epistemic deontology might rightly be thought to involve something more to 
distinguish it from epistemic consequentialism, and epistemic virtue theory. For more on a pure form of 
epistemic deontology, see P. N. Turner “Epistemic Deontology and the Consequentialist Consensus,” 
Masters Thesis presented to the faculty of the University of North Carolina, at Chapel Hill, 2004. 
However, whatever more is required, the view will include a commitment to the idea that beliefs are 
proper subjects of doxastic oughts, and the cogency of this idea is what will be under discussion here. 
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deontology must be false, and are thus forced to explain away the intuitions behind the true 
doxastic oughts principle, while epistemic deontologists argue that doxastic involuntarism must 
be false, and are thus forced to explain away the intuitions behind the no rewards principle. 
 My primary purpose in this paper is to sketch a theory of doxastic oughts that achieves a 
satisfying middle ground between the extremes of rejecting epistemic deontology because of the 
no rewards principle and rejecting doxastic involuntarism because of the true doxastic oughts 
principle. The key will be appreciating the fact that not all true oughts require direct voluntary 
control. I will construct my account as an attempt to surpass other accounts (especially those 
due to Feldman and Kornblith) in this vein. The new idea (in a telegraphic slogan) is that 
doxastic oughts are what Sellars called “rules of criticism”, which are logically distinct from but 
also interestingly connected to “rules of action”. The distinction provides a way to understand 
the phrase “ought to believe” which is consistent with both doxastic involuntarism and epistemic 
deontology; the connection provides a novel way to incorporate a believer’s epistemic 
community into our understanding of the scope of epistemic obligations. 
 
2. REJECTING DOXASTIC INVOLUNTARISM: A MISTAKEN REACTION TO THE TENSION 
 
To begin I want to consider two arguments against doxastic involuntarism because I think the 
way in which they fail is instructive. The first can be extracted in Ryan’s response to premise 2 of 
what she calls “The Anti-Voluntarist Argument”, which goes: 
1. If we have any epistemic obligations, then doxastic attitudes must sometimes be 
under our voluntary control. 
2. Doxastic attitudes are never under our voluntarily control. 
3. We do not have any epistemic obligations (1), (2).9 
As we have already seen, doxastic involuntarism is motivated in large part by the no rewards 
principle, which seems to illustrate that we do not have the power simply to decide whether to 
believe or disbelieve p. Ryan directly denies this: “if I make a decision to switch doxastic 
attitudes, I can adjust my doxastic attitudes accordingly.”10 But what then does she say about the 
intuitive examples which motivate the no rewards principle? Ryan thinks they do not undermine 
doxastic voluntarism because they are not cases where one is given good reason to change one’s 
attitudes. She writes, “My doxastic decisions are guided by what seems to me to be good 
evidence (or whatever it is that motivates me).”11 She grants that “Without new evidence, or a 
new appreciation of my evidence, I cannot typically just decide to switch propositional 
attitudes”12, but she insists that, “…once I have a reason to decide to change attitudes, I can and I 
do. This limitation is not a limitation of my doxastic freedom and it is not a good reason to 
accept premise (2) of [the Anti-Voluntarist Argument].”13 
 However, there seems to me to be an important equivocation in this argument. Ryan 
talks of the need for “evidence”, “reason to decide to change attitudes”, and, cryptically, 
“whatever it is that motivates me” in order to decide to change propositional attitudes. Yet, 
surely the offer of a large reward to believe that the U.S. is still a colony of Great Britain is a 
pretty good “reason to decide to change attitudes”? It seems that, if such decision were in Ryan’s 
                                                
9 Op. cit., p. 48. Ryan actually thinks both premises are false. Below I will consider some reasons one 
might reject premise 1, but that is, of course, consistent with doxastic involuntarism. Compare also Steup, 
op. cit., 2000, p. 26, and Feldman, op. cit., 2000, p. 669, where similar arguments are criticized. 
10 Op. cit., p. 65. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., p. 66. 
13 Ibid. 
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power, the reward surely would “motivate” her. The fact that it does not is what is supposed to 
show that such decision is not within her power. 
Hieronymi14 makes a distinction that is helpful for diagnosing the error in Ryan’s 
argument. She distinguishes between what she calls “constitutive reasons” and “extrinsic 
reasons” for a belief. Constitutive reasons for the belief that p are reasons that bear on the 
question whether p; to find them convincing just is to believe that p. By contrast, extrinsic 
reasons for the belief that p are reasons that count in favor of believing p independently of 
whether p. They are reasons that bear rather on the question whether it would be good to believe 
that p; finding them convincing does not constitute believing that p. In light of this distinction, 
Ryan’s claim that “My doxastic decisions are guided by what seems to me to be good evidence 
(or whatever it is that motivates me)” can be seen to run together two different kinds of reasons 
for belief. Evidence provides constitutive reasons for belief, while other considerations provide 
(if anything) extrinsic reasons for belief. 
When the involuntarist claims that believing that p is not the sort of thing that one can 
voluntarily decide to do, I think this should be understood as the claim that beliefs are not 
responsive to practical reasons in the same way that actions are. That is, beliefs are not 
responsive to what Bennett15 described as reasons that bear on what to make true as opposed to 
reasons that bear on what is true. Practical reasons are typically a set of considerations that 
show an action to be somehow choice worthy. For example, getting a large reward could be a 
reason to do what it takes to get the reward. However, such considerations do not typically bear 
on the question whether a particular proposition is true, so they are not—in Hieronymi’s 
terminology—constitutive reasons for belief. For instance, the fact that you’ll receive a large 
reward for believing that the US is still a colony of Britain clearly does not bear on the question 
whether the US is still a colony of Britain, so the reward is not a constitutive reason for that 
belief. What the reward does bear on is whether it would be worthwhile to have that belief 
independently of whether it is true. This means that such considerations are—in Hieronymi’s 
terminology—extrinsic reasons for belief. So, if choice requires practical reasons and practical 
reasons are extrinsic reasons for belief, it would seem that the ability to voluntarily decide to 
believe some proposition p requires that one be capable of believing p on the basis of extrinsic 
reasons for belief. But, what the no rewards principle shows is precisely that we cannot typically 
form a belief for extrinsic reasons (even if we can, for such reasons, perform an action that has 
as a consequence that one comes to have certain beliefs).16 When offered a large reward for 
believing that the US is still a colony of Britain, one cannot do it, though one may be capable of 
doing something else, like undergoing shock therapy (or whatever), designed to induce the 
belief. 
So I think Ryan’s argument fails in its conflation of constitutive reasons and extrinsic 
reasons for belief. The former do not count as reasons to decide to do something because they 
are not practical reasons, and, while the latter may be practical reasons for deciding on some 
action, they do not motivate belief. However, it is important to notice that premise 2 of the anti-
voluntarist argument does not say that we never have the power to voluntarily decide on our 
doxastic attitudes; rather it says that our doxastic attitudes are never under our voluntary 
control. This opens up space for an alternative strategy for undermining that premise, which in 
                                                
14 “The Wrong Kind of Reason,” The Journal of Philosophy, 102 (2005): 437-57. For a different use of the 
same distinction, see also P. Hieronymi “Controlling Attitudes,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 87 
(2006), p. 51-52. 
15 Op. cit. 
16 See Hieronymi, op. cit., 2006, p. 52-60, for a plausible explanation of why extrinsic reasons cannot 
directly motivate belief. The details are not important here, but what is important is that the no rewards 
principle shows that extrinsic reasons cannot motivate belief, which seems to undermine doxastic 
voluntarism. 
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turn generates a different sort of argument against involuntarism. To see this, notice that the 
voluntarist could concede to the involuntarist that we do not have the power to voluntarily 
decide on our doxastic attitudes but then argue that this power is not a necessary condition on 
voluntary control. If it is not necessary for voluntary control, then perhaps we have voluntary 
control over our beliefs even though we lack the ability to voluntarily decide on our doxastic 
attitudes. Given the way it is formulated above, this possibility would clearly undermine doxastic 
involuntarism. 
Assuming that voluntary decision is a kind of choice, this argument against 
involuntarism is akin to Steup’s response to what he calls “The Argument from Choice”, which 
goes: 
P1 One’s ϕing is free iff one could have chosen not to ϕ. 
P2 I could have chosen not to have a cup of coffee. 
P3 I could not have chosen not to believe that cats are mammals. 
C Whereas my having a cup of coffee is free my believing that cats are mammals is 
not.17 
Locating the misstep in Ryan’s argument helped to highlight the importance of the distinction 
between constitutive and extrinsic reasons for belief, but it left open the possibility that doxastic 
involuntarism is false because voluntary control doesn’t require ability to decide voluntarily. 
Likewise, locating the misstep in Steup’s response to this new argument will help us to see why 
this possibility doesn’t undermine doxastic involuntarism.  
Steup considers three conceptions of what it means to say that one could have chosen 
not to ϕ:18 
C1 I ϕd but I could have chosen not to ϕ iff I ϕd but had I a reason not to ϕ I would 
not have ϕd. 
He argues that on this conception, P3 is false. He writes, “Had I had a reason not to believe that 
cats are mammals, I would not have believed it…doxastic attitudes are no less reason responsive 
than our actions.”19 So, if a proponent of DI rests his case on the idea that voluntary control in 
doing ϕ requires the power to choose not to ϕ, he will need a conception of choice different from 
C1. Next he consideres: 
C2 I ϕd but could have chosen not to ϕ iff I ϕd but had I intended not to ϕ I would 
not have ϕd.  
Regarding this conception, he concedes that “our doxastic attitudes do not respond to 
intentions, so doxastic attitudes never meet the condition C2 states”20; however, he argues that 
responsiveness to intentions is not a necessary condition on something’s being done freely. He 
writes, “Assessing the freedom of actions calls for one yardstick, assessing the freedom of 
doxastic attitudes for another. It’s a mistake to think that the freedom of actions and the 
freedom of doxastic attitudes can be gauged using one single yardstick.”21 Finally there is: 
C3 I ϕd but could have chosen not to ϕ iff I ϕd but had I decided not to ϕ I would not 
have ϕd. 
And regarding this, he argues, in effect, that it collapses into C1. If deciding is just deliberating 
by weighing reasons in order to reach a conclusion, then he thinks we surely can weigh reasons 
                                                
17 Op. cit., forthcoming, p. 20 of ms. 
18 These come from ibid., p. 20-21 of ms. 
19 Ibid. Of course, they seem to be responsive to a different kind of reason, but more on this below. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
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for belief in order to reach a decision. This leads to the view that “Weighing my practical 
reasons, I might decide not to perform a certain action. Likewise, weighing my epistemic 
reasons, I might decide not to adopt a certain doxastic attitude. If ‘deciding not to ϕ’ is thus 
understood broadly, P3 is false.”22 Of course, one might insist that deciding is not mere 
responsiveness to reasons but instead the formation of an intention, and, since beliefs do not 
appear to be responsive to intentions, they fail to count as voluntary according to C3. However, I 
think Steup would argue that this response, in effect, collapses C3 into C2, to which his 
response, again, is that responsiveness to intentions is not a necessary condition for voluntary 
control. 
That is Steup’s response to the Argument from Choice. On any of the three conceptions 
of choice, he thinks the argument fails to be sound. With respect to the debate between 
epistemic deontology and doxastic involuntarism, the thrust of Steup’s argument here is that 
thinking of beliefs as proper subjects of broadly epistemic oughts presupposes only that some 
beliefs are free and not that beliefs are things that we can choose in the narrow sense of choice 
embodied in C2. So, if, in the idea that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, ‘can’ means ‘can choose’ in the sense 
of C2, Steup will say that this idea is simply mistaken. To think otherwise, he contends, is to 
measure the voluntariness of doxastic attitudes by the wrong “yardstick.”23 
However, this raises the question: by what yardstick are we to measure the voluntariness 
of doxastic attitudes? And Steup starts us in an apparently promising direction: according to 
him, it has something to do with responsiveness to epistemic reasons. A walk in the park is 
voluntary if I do it for practical reasons which do not involve coercion, manipulation, paranoia, 
etc. Likewise believing that cats are mammals is voluntary if I believe that for epistemic reasons 
which do not involve wishful thinking, prejudice, hypnosis, etc. This both distinguishes doxastic 
attitudes from actions and locates them under one genus of potential freedom—viz., 
responsiveness to the appropriate sort of reasons. Moreover, it helps to explain why beliefs 
formed by wishful thinking, prejudice, hypnosis, etc. are not within our voluntary control: they 
are not responsive to epistemic reasons. 
I think we should grant that Steup’s notion of responsiveness to reasons provides a way 
to distinguish between two significant classes of doxastic attitudes—“free” and “unfree”. What I 
would not grant, however, is that this distinction can be used to resolve the tension between 
doxastic involuntarism and epistemic deontology. For, although they are free from irrational 
influence, “free” doxastic attitudes are not things over which we exercise direct voluntary 
control. It is because of this that the no rewards principle is so intuitively attractive. Even 
though our doxastic attitudes are sometimes responsive only to epistemic reasons and thus 
“free”, believing or disbelieving a particular proposition is not the sort of thing that it is coherent 
to offer to reward someone to do. 
Why not? As far as I can tell, Steup’s best response to this question is to explain the 
intuitive difference between doxastic attitudes and ordinary actions, on which the no rewards 
principle turns, as a reflection of the difference between the types of reasons to which doxastic 
attitudes and ordinary actions are usually responsive. Both can be “free” because both are 
responsive to reasons, but the former are, when free, responsive to epistemic reasons while the 
latter are, when free, responsive to practical reasons. Yet, as we saw above, the offer of a reward 
might provide a practical reason but it surely provides no epistemic reason; this is because such 
rewards are merely extrinsic reasons for the belief, while epistemic reasons are constitutive 
reasons. And so I suspect opponents of epistemic deontology will take this response as grist to 
their mill. For their problem with epistemic deontology should not be its dependence on the idea 
                                                
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
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that beliefs are free on this sense of “free” but rather the fact that it implies that ‘ought’ can 
apply to things over which we lack voluntary control. 
Steup does anticipate something like this worry when he argues against what he calls 
“Practical Reasons Chauvinism” which is the view that, “Whereas responsiveness to practical 
reasons grounds freedom, responsiveness to epistemic reasons does not.”24 However, the point I 
am making here is that even if we grant that responsiveness solely to epistemic reasons makes 
doxastic attitudes free, this is different from the sort of control opponents of epistemic 
deontology think is necessary for true doxastic oughts. About apparently free actions and 
apparently free beliefs, Steup writes,  
…there is a reason-responsiveness in either case. Thus there is a strong prima facie case 
for thinking there is voluntary control in either case. If opponents of doxastic freedom 
wish to resist this line of reasoning, they need to justify the chauvinistic premise that 
responsiveness to epistemic reasons does not count as a freedom-grounding kind of 
responsiveness.25 
But I think Steup conflates freedom and voluntary control in this passage. The involuntarist can 
grant that doxastic attitudes can often be free in that they are often free from irrational 
influence and responsive to epistemic reasons. There need be no chauvinism about types of 
freedom here. But the involuntarist will insist that, since doxastic attitudes are not responsive to 
practical reasons, they are not under our direct voluntary control. And—the thought goes—since 
‘ought’ implies ‘can’, demonstrating lack of voluntary control is all that is necessary to 
undermine epistemic deontology. 
 
3. REJECTING “OUGHT IMPLIES CAN”: A STEP TOWARDS A SOLUTION 
 
So far, we have been considering defenses of epistemic deontology that rest on rejecting doxastic 
involuntarism. But, since I think these defenses are not successful and because I would like to 
develop an account of doxastic oughts that is consistent with both doxastic involuntarism and 
epistemic deontology, I now want to reconsider the popular idea that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, which 
seems crucial to the involuntarists’ argument against epistemic deontology. In the literature 
about this, there are a variety of ostensible counter examples and attempts to hone the idea to 
avoid them.26 For example, it seems true that you ought to pick up your friend on time, even if, 
because you left too late, you can no longer do so. Also, it seems true that your friend ought not 
to steal, even if, because she’s a kleptomaniac, she cannot help herself. However, in my view, 
these sorts of counterexamples and the proposed fixes are a red-herring in the debate between 
proponents of doxastic involuntarism and epistemic deontology. This is because they are 
examples of actions that all participants to that debate would agree can in principle be under 
our direct voluntary control even if there are cases when they are not. The vexing thing about 
doxastic attitudes, however, is not that there are some situations where we ought to have a 
particular doxastic attitude even though we do not happen to exercise voluntary control over 
them in that situation; rather the vexing thing is that the no rewards principle seems to show 
that doxastic attitudes are never under our direct voluntary control but it still seems as if we 
ought to have some of them. How can this be? Merely undermining the general ‘ought’ implies 
‘can’ principle with a counterexample based on actions cannot answer this question. 
                                                
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., pp.18-19 of ms. 
26 For discussion of several epicycles, see Ryan, op. cit., drawing on M. Stocker, “‘Ought’ and ‘Can’” 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 49, 3 (1971): 313-317; and W. Sinnott-Armstrong, "‘Ought’ 
Conversationally Implies ‘Can’," The Philosophical Review, 93, 2 (1984): 249-261. 
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This point is relevant for evaluating two prominent proposals for understanding doxastic 
oughts in the face of the tension between the no rewards principle and the true doxastic oughts 
principle. The first comes from Feldman, who argues that doxastic oughts are akin to role 
oughts.27 As examples he suggests that, “Teachers ought to explain things clearly. Parents ought 
to take care of their kids. Cyclists ought to move in various ways.”28 In the present discussion, 
the significance of these is that role ‘ought’s seem not to imply ‘can’s.29 An incompetent teacher 
ought to explain things clearly but she cannot; an incapable parent ought to take care of his kids, 
but he cannot; an untrained cyclist ought to move in various ways, but she cannot.30 If doxastic 
oughts were similar, then the fact that we do not have direct voluntary control over our doxastic 
attitudes would not undermine epistemic deontology. This is why Feldman suggests that we 
often are in the role of a believer. He writes, “…we form beliefs in response to our experiences in 
the world. Anyone engaged in this activity ought to do it right. In my view, what they ought to do 
is to follow their evidence (rather than wishes or fears). I suggest that epistemic oughts are of 
this sort.’31 
However, a serious problem with this proposal is that, unlike Feldman’s examples of role 
oughts, doxastic oughts seem to be categorical. Even if you do not want to believe the truth 
about what you are doing right now, you ought to believe that you are reading this paper right 
now.32 As Kornblith puts the point, in “the epistemic case,” by contrast to optional roles like 
teacher, parent, or cyclist, “we not only want to say that if someone wants to be a good believer, 
he or she should believe in certain ways; we also wish to endorse the claim that individuals 
ought, without qualification, to believe in those ways which, as a matter of fact, flow from good 
performance of the role of being a believer.”33 It seems that Feldman’s only means for explaining 
this contrast is the fact that, unlike the roles of teacher, parent, and cyclist, we have no choice 
about whether to take on the role of being a believer. However, this is a bad explanation. The 
kleptomaniac may also have no choice about whether to take on the role of a thief, but we would 
not want to say that she categorically ought to steal. Exactly the opposite: she categorically ought 
                                                
27 Op. cit., p. 675. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Later in Feldman “Modest Deontologism in Epistemology,” Synthese, forthcoming, he makes a 
compatible proposal, suggesting that “S ought to believe that p” should be analyzed as “Believing that p is 
the epistemically appropriate response to S’s evidence.” He takes this to be a way of spelling out the idea 
that in one’s role as a believer one ought to follow one’s evidence. Whatever way we spell out the details, I 
still think Feldman’s proposal falls prey to the criticisms I go on to articulate above. 
30 Campbell Brown has suggested to me in conversation that Feldman’s thought here involves a scope 
confusion. It is true that not all teachers can explain things clearly, but this undermines only a narrow 
scope reading of “Teachers ought to explain things clearly”. The narrow scope reading is “For all x, if x is a 
teacher then ought (x explains things clearly).” The wide scope reading is “For all X, ought(if X is a 
teacher, then X explains things clearly)”, and Brown’s idea is that this is not undermined by the fact that 
not all teachers can explain things clearly. The ones who cannot could satisfy this obligation by quitting 
their jobs. There are naturally some questions about whether this wide-scoping move is fully defensible. 
But, in any case, it seems wrong to me to think of doxastic oughts as role oughts for reasons that emerge 
more clearly in the text below. 
31 Ibid. 
32 For a similar point, compare T. Kelly, “Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique,” 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 64 (2003). 
33 "Epistemic Obligation and the Possibility of Internalism" in A. Fairweather and L. Zagzebski, eds. 
Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility, (New York; Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), p. 237. Kornblith might not want to call these “categorical” oughts but rather a 
sort of hypothetical ought where the hypotheticality is cancelled for any agent with any desires—for the 
full view, see his Knowledge and its Place in Nature, (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford 
University Press, 2002), ch. 5. 
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not to steal. So the mere fact that it is our “plight” to play certain roles cannot explain the 
apparent categoricity of doxastic oughts. 
Kornblith has an alternative proposal, which I think provides a crucial insight. He 
suggests that what Feldman is right about is that some oughts come from evaluations of what 
counts as good performance; and the cogency of such oughts clearly does not require voluntary 
control to do what they prescribe or proscribe, as illustrated by role oughts deriving from roles 
such as teacher, parent, and cyclist. But, according to Kornblith, this is also true of ideals. He 
writes, 
An appropriate human ideal must in some ways be responsive to human capacities. 
Ideals are meant to play some role in guiding action, and an ideal that took no account of 
human limitations would thereby lose its capacity to play a constructive action-guiding 
role. At the same time, our ideals cannot be so closely tied to what particular individuals 
are capable of that we fail to recognize that some individuals at some times are incapable 
of performing in ideal ways. There is a large middle ground here, and it is here that 
reasonable ideals are to be found.34 
So, for example, respecting the legitimate property of others is plausibly thought to be a moral 
ideal, and from this ideal, it probably follows that one ought not to steal. The fact that, for 
example, your kleptomaniac friend cannot help but to steal does not undermine the fact that she 
ought not to steal. 
 Kornblith thinks this helps to preserve epistemic deontology in the face of the no rewards 
principle. He writes, “once we recognize that our ideals must lie somewhere within this large 
middle ground, we see that the defensibility of the oughts that flow from our epistemic ideals 
does not require the level of voluntary control over our beliefs that Alston and Plantinga insist 
upon”(Ibid.). But because these oughts flow from ideals rather than roles, their normative force 
can be categorical unlike the role oughts cited by Feldman. Kornblith writes, “Although the role 
of being a slave might be performed well, it is perfectly reasonable to suppose that being a slave, 
whether the role be performed well or badly, is no part of any acceptable human ideal. It is for 
this reason that oughts which flow from human ideals have a degree of normative force that is 
not shared by role oughts.”35 
 I think Kornblith is right that doxastic oughts derive from our epistemic ideals. And it is 
certainly correct that human ideals may transcend particular humans’ capacities without 
undermining the oughts that derive from them. The moral ideal of respecting others’ property 
underwrites the moral proscription, “One ought not to steal,” even if your kleptomaniac friend 
cannot help herself. Nevertheless, I do not think Kornblith’s comparison to moral ideals is very 
helpful for addressing the apparent tension between the true doxastic oughts principle and the 
no rewards principle. This is because the problem the no rewards principle was supposed to 
cause for epistemic deontology is not that true doxastic oughts transcend particular humans’ 
capacities to form beliefs but rather that forming beliefs does not seem to be the sort of thing 
that anyone has direct voluntary control over. Again, the upshot here is that action-types that 
provide ostensible counterexamples to the idea that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ are not suitable as 
models for doxastic oughts in the fact of the no rewards principle, which seems o show that 
beliefs are never actions over which we exercise direct voluntary control. 
 
4. A BETTER ACCOUNT 
 
                                                
34 Op. cit., 2001, p. 238. 
35 Ibid., p. 238-239. 
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In different ways, my criticism of Ryan and Steup, on the one hand, and Feldman and Kornblith, 
on the other, rest on the same underlying thought: There is an important difference between 
actions like raising one’s hand and turning on the lights and states of mind like belief and 
disbelief. To show that categories like “freedom” and “reason-responsive” can apply to both, is 
not yet to undermine doxastic involuntarism nor is it to explain (away) the no rewards principle. 
And to show that there are cases where it looks like someone ought to perform some action that 
she cannot is not yet to show doxastic involuntarism to be compatible with epistemic deontology 
nor is it to explain the no rewards principle. For the no rewards principle is an illustration not of 
the fact that sometimes some people cannot do what they ought to do but rather the fact that 
believing is not, in the relevant sense, an action that anyone can ever voluntarily perform.  
So, in developing a more satisfactory view of doxastic oughts, I think it is helpful to 
notice that there are all sorts of oughts that apply not to actions but to states. For instance, your 
doctor might advise that “You ought to have lower blood pressure,” or the clock repairman 
might point out that “The clock chimes ought to strike on the quarter hour,” and the camp 
counselor might tell her campers that “All the beds ought to be made every morning.” These 
oughts are oughts that, when true, seem to be true despite the fact that your blood pressure, the 
clock’s chiming, and the beds being made are not, properly speaking, things that are in 
someone’s direct voluntary control. This is not because we (or some of us) happen to lack 
control over a particular sort of action, rather it is because these things are not actions at all. 
They are ways of being rather than actions that some agent does. 
 This encourages the following distinction: we seem to have ‘ought-to-do’s, on the one 
hand, and ‘ought-to-be’s, on the other—or, what Sellars termed “rules of action” and “rules of 
criticism”.36 Only the former seem to presuppose any sort of control on the part of the subject of 
the ought.  
 Now, this distinction may seem to be unavailable if we follow the standard view in 
deontic logic and treat ‘ought’ as a unary modal operator applying to propositions.37 On a very 
schematic version of this view, all ought-statements with a particular subject can be transformed 
into impersonal constructions beginning with “It ought to be the case that…” in a way that elides 
the distinction between ‘ought-to-do’s and ‘ought-to-be’s. For example, “Eric ought to pick up 
Ellie on time” and “The clock ought to strike on the quarter hour” would be transformed into “It 
ought to be the case that Eric picks up Ellie on time” and “It ought to be the case that the clock 
strikes on the quarter hour.” Treating ‘ought’ as this kind of unary modal operator is helpfully 
simplifying for developing the semantics and proof theory for deontic logic; however, the 
problem with this in the present context is that this way of proceeding seems to wash away the 
distinction between oughts that might reasonably be thought to presuppose voluntary control of 
their subjects and those which do not.38 This is why I want to resist the idea that ought is just a 
                                                
36 "Language as Thought and as Communication," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 29 
(1969): 506-527. For a similar distinction, compare L. Humberstone, “Two Sorts of ‘Ought’s,” Analysis, 32 
(1971): 8-11. 
37 See McNamara, Paul, "Deontic Logic", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2006 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2006/entries/logic-
deontic/>. 
38 There are some attempts to modify the standard view to include a place for the agent in the proposition 
to which the ought-operator applies. For instance, by deploying a ‘stit’ (“see to it”) device in the statement 
of the proposition to which an ought applies, we can create a spot for an agent. For example, “It ought to 
be the case that Eric picks up Ellie” could be construed as “It ought to be the case that Eric sees to it that 
he picks up Ellie on time,” in order to preserve reference to agency. See J. Horty, Agency and Deontic 
Logic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). See also J. Broome, “Normative Requirements,” Ratio, 12, 
4 (2000): 398-419, and R. Wedgwood, “The Meaning of ‘Ought’,” Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 1 (2006): 
127-160, for other attempts to modify the standard view to preserve reference to agency. I will not discuss 
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unary modal operator applying to propositions.39 However, that does not commit me to saying 
that ‘ought’ is never a unary modal operator on propositions. ‘Ought’ clearly has a nonnormative 
use in sentences such as “Given how the sky looks tonight, it ought to rain tomorrow.” 
Moreover, some uses of ‘ought’ may be merely “political” as Sidwick 40 calls them (to distinguish 
them from “agential”).41 The idea is that some things ought to be the case because they are 
generally desirable, although no particular agent ought to do anything to make things this way. 
For example, perhaps the party ought to start early (so as not to disturb the neighbors later), but 
no one in particular is responsible for starting the party early. The nonnormative ought and the 
political ought may be plausibly interpreted as unary modal operators on propositoons, but, 
even so, I think it would be wrong to treat ‘ought’ always in this way. The distinction between 
rules of criticism and rules of action is supposed to help distinguish between two kinds of oughts 
that are both not unary modal operators. 
 Insisting on this distinction is not meant to rule out the possibility that rules of criticism 
and rules of action are logically related. In fact, Sellars boldly claimed that, “…though ought-to-
be’s are carefully to be distinguished from ought-to-do’s they have an essential connection with 
them. The connection is, roughly, that ought-to-be’s imply ought-to-do’s.”42 It will prove helpful 
briefly to explore what Sellars has in mind. The general form of the implication is material 
(rather than formal)43 and involves a heavy ceteris paribus clause, but I take the core idea to be 
that statements of the form, 
 X’s ought to be in state ϕ, 
where these are not merely nonnormative or political uses of ‘ought, materially imply statements 
of the form, 
 (Other things being equal and where possible) one ought to bring it about that X’s are in 
state ϕ. 
 Sellars puts this distinction to crucial use in a general account of linguistic activity as 
through and through rule-governed, which is nonetheless compatible with denying that all (or 
even a significant portion of) linguistic activity should be thought of as actions performed in 
accordance with particular rules. The leading idea is to construe most linguistic rules as rules of 
criticism rather than rules of action. He writes, “To be a language user is to conceive of oneself 
as an agent subject to rules.44” But the value of the distinction between rules of action and rules 
                                                                                                                                                       
these views in any detail here. As will emerge below, although I think we need to preserve reference to a 
not merely grammatical subject of some oughts, this subject won’t always be a agent. 
39 For other, more grammatical arguments for resisting the standard view in deontic logic, see M. 
Schroeder, “Do Oughts Take Propositions” (manuscript). 
40 The Methods of Ethics, 7th edition (London: Macmillan, 1907), p. 34. 
41 See also B. Williams, “Ought and Moral Obligation,” in his Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, (1981); and R. Wedgwood, op. cit., for discussion of this distinction. Wedgwood suggests 
a modification of the standard view in order to preserve the agential nature of some oughts while still 
construing them as unary modal operators. 
42 Op. cit., p. 508. 
43 That is to say that it is not merely in virtue of the logical form of the statements that an inference from 
one rule to the other is correct, rather it is in part because of the nature of the concepts deployed in the 
statements that such an inference is correct. For example, the inference from “x is a triangle” to “x has 
three sides” is materially correct. (Compare Sellars “Inference and Meaning,” Mind, 62, 247 (1953): 313-
338, on the materially correct inference from “Pittsburgh is to the west of Princeton” to “Princeton is to 
the east of Pittsburgh.”) 
44 Op. cit., 1969, p. 513. 
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of criticism, according to him, is that “one can grant this without holding that all meaningful 
linguistic episodes are actions in the conduct sense, and all linguistic rules, rules for doing.”45 
  Here is not the place to evaluate the complex role of rules in Sellars’ general theory of 
linguistic activity, but I do want to take away one lesson from it. Although the paradigmatic rules 
of criticism apply to things that are not agents—such as clocks and beds—there is nothing to 
prevent rules of criticism from applying to agents as they are in various states. Moreover, this 
does not impinge on the way that rules of criticism imply interpersonal rules of action. So, for 
example, Sellars suggests that a possible rule governing basic perceptual reports is that, 
 One ought to respond to red objects in sunlight by uttering or being disposed to utter 
‘this is red’ under appropriate prompting.46 
Although this alleged rule of criticism applies to speakers of a language and to those who are in 
the process of learning a language, it is not to be confused with the (merely putative) rule of 
action, 
 One ought to say ‘this is red’ in response to red objects in sunlight under appropriate 
promoting. 
In his view, this rule of action could be understood and so voluntarily followed only by those 
who already have the concepts of red, object, sunlight, and what it is to say something. So, 
importantly, Sellars thinks this could not constitute a rule language learners genuinely follow in 
acquiring the concept of red (or, for that matter, the concepts object, sunlight, and what it is to 
say something).47 But, in Sellars’ view that does not mean that the rules of criticism that govern 
linguistic activity have no connection to rules of action, for, in his view, rules of criticism imply 
rules of action. In particular, he suggests that the above ought-to-be implies the following ought-
to-do: 
One ought to bring it about (ceteris paribus) that people respond to red objects in 
sunlight by uttering or being disposed to utter ‘this is red’ under appropriate promoting. 
 The ‘one’ here is vague, and making it more precise can help to distinguish between three 
possible views one might take about ‘ought-to-be’s. One relatively deflationary idea is that 
‘ought-to-be’s materially imply a certain sort of conditional ‘ought-to-do’s. Generically,  
(*) X ought to be ϕ 
materially implies 
If someone is responsible for X’s being ϕ, then that person ought to do what he/she can 
(ceteris paribus) to bring it about that X is ϕ. 
                                                
45 Ibid. 
46 I have changed Sellars’ example slightly to make it more intuitive and to make it more clearly fit the 
general formula stated above. He wrote, “(Ceteris paribus) one ought to respond to red objects in sunlight 
by uttering or being disposed to utter ‘this is red’”(Ibid., p. 511). 
47 What about the linguistic rule “One ought not use unattached participles”, which seems true even if the 
person to whom it applies does not have the concept of an unattached participle? Sellars would insist that 
if this really is a true linguistic rule applying to all English speakers, we should view it as a rule of criticism 
(perhaps more precisely stated as: “One ought not to be disposed to use unattached participles”). And if it 
is rather meant as a rule of action, then it cannot apply to subjects who lack the relevant conceptual 
resources to follow it. The technical distinction between rules of action and rules of criticism is (in part) 
defined by whether the rule presupposes that the subject has the conceptual resources to follow it. 
(Thanks to John Broome for pressing me to make this point clearer.) 
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Call this the conditional view of the logical relationship between ‘ought-to-be’s and ‘ought-to-
do’s.48 A much stronger view sees ‘ought-to-be’s as materially implying universal ‘ought-to-
do’s—generically, that is, (*) implies 
 Everyone ought to do what he/she can (ceteris paribus) to bring it about that X is ϕ. 
Call this the universal view of the logical relationship between ‘ought-to-be’s and ‘ought-to-do’s. 
A third middle view sees ‘ought-to-be’s as materially implying nonconditional but also 
nonuniversal ‘ought-to-do’s—generically, that is, (*) implies 
 Someone ought to do what he/she can (ceteris paribus) to bring it about that X is ϕ. 
Call this the existential view of the logical relationship between ‘ought-to-be’s and ‘ought-to-
do’s. On this view, a true ought-to-be implies that someone is responsible for making the subject 
of the ought-to-be be the way it ought to be. 
 Sometimes Sellars seems to be adopting the universal view of linguistic rules of criticism, 
which seems to me to be the correct view of moral ‘ought-to-be’s, such as 
 People ought to feel outrage about genocide 
which then be said to imply 
 Everyone ought to do what he/she can (ceteris paribus) to bring it about that people feel 
outrage about genocide.49 
However, Sellars’ leading example suggests the conditional view instead. This is 
 Clock chimes ought to strike on the quarter hour, 
which seems to imply at most that  
 If someone is responsible for the (relevant) clock chimes, then that person ought to do 
whatever he/she can (ceteris paribus) to bring it about that they strike on the quarter 
hour. 
This is made clearer by noticing the parallel to, 
 The bomb ought to spread shrapnel widely 
which hopefully does not imply anything more than the conditional 
 If someone is responsible for the bomb’s spreading shrapnel widely, then that person 
ought to do whatever he/she can (ceteris paribus) to make the bomb spread shrapnel 
widely, 
whose antecedent is, at least morally speaking, usually false. However, the intuitive idea of 
teaching our children things by doing what we can to get them to conform to particular rules of 
criticism suggests to me neither a universal ought-to-do nor a merely conditional ought-to-do. 
For instance, if it is true that a child ought to be able to tie his shoes by age four, then it would 
seem also to be true that someone (his guardians, but not everyone) has an obligation to teach 
him to be this way. This suggests the existential view. That is to say that 
 This child ought to be able to tie his shoes by age four 
implies 
                                                
48 While “conditional”, it would be wrong to think of the resulting ‘ought-to-do’s as therefore 
“hypothetical”. The sense in which they are conditional is not that they are conditional on the agent’s 
antecedent ends/desires, which is what hypotheticality requires. The conditional-unconditional 
distinction cuts across the hypothetical-categorical distinction. 
49 Sellars uses a similar example where I think intuitions are less clear: “One ought to feel sympathy for 
the bereaved.” He suggests that this materially implies that one ought (ceteris paribus) to bring it about 
that people feel sympathy for the bereaved. See Ibid., p. 509. It is important to remember that the ceteris 
paribus clause might be relied on quite heavily in cases where there are other obligations to mind one’s 
own business or to do something else more important than influencing people’s feelings about genocide.  
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 Someone ought to do what he/she can (ceteris paribus) to bring it about that this child is 
able to tie his shoes by age four. 
 Which is the correct view of linguistic rules of criticism—the unconditional view 
suggested by the genocide example, the conditional view suggested by the clock example, or the 
existential view suggested by the shoe-tying example? I suspect that the latter view is correct in 
the linguistic case, but, more generally, I want to recognize the conceptual possibility of all three 
sorts of ‘ought-to-be’s. What is important to me here is that, in one way or another, Sellars’ idea 
of rules of criticism provides a good model for doxastic oughts. The idea would be to treat 
doxastic oughts as a species of rules of criticism (one of perhaps several distinctively epistemic 
species). They are of the form 
X ought to be in doxastic attitude A towards proposition p under conditions C. 
For instance, 
 X ought to believe that X is reading this paper right now under the condition that X is 
reading this paper right now in normal circumstances. 
The crucial thing is that just like the other rules of criticism I have mentioned, viz. 
 The clock’s chimes ought to strike at the quarter hour, 
 All the beds ought to be made every morning, 
 A child ought to be able to tie his/her shoes by age four, 
 People ought to feel outrage about genocide, 
and 
One ought to respond to red objects in sunlight by uttering or being disposed to utter 
‘this is red’ when appropriately prompted, 
doxastic oughts seem to be true, so thinking of doxastic oughts on this model—whether it is as 
implying conditional, unconditional, or existential ‘ought-to-do’s—respects the true doxastic 
oughts principle. But doxastic oughts, conceived of as rules of criticism, are also consistent with 
doxastic involuntarism since, as the examples of the clock and the beds clearly reveal, rules of 
criticism do not have as a precondition on their truth that their subjects be capable of 
voluntarily following the rule. So thinking of doxastic oughts on this model also respects the no 
rewards principle. However, as Sellars’ account of linguistic rules of criticism reveals, none of 
this implies that believers cannot be agents. We just have to appreciate that they do not exercise 
agency in believe what they believe.  
 By respecting both the true doxastic oughts principle and the no rewards principle, this 
account avoids the drastic choice between doxastic involuntarism and epistemic deontology with 
which I began. Moreover, I think it surpasses the accounts suggested by Feldman and Kornblith. 
Let me explain.  
 Regarding Feldman: Even though he does not make this point, presumably some role 
oughts are rules of criticism—e.g. “Teachers ought to be interested in their subject.” However, 
such role-driven rules of criticism are not plausibly thought to be categorical. Good performance 
of the role of a kleptomaniac may require that one be cunning, but it is not a categorical rule of 
criticism that one ought to be cunning if one is a kleptomaniac. Rather, we want to say that, if 
one is a kleptomaniac, one ought to be treated by a psychiatrist. But, while this is perhaps a 
categorical rule of criticism, it is not a role-ought. And, likewise, doxastic oughts conceived of as 
rules of criticism seem to be categorical in a way that role oughts are not. So by treating doxastic 
oughts as rules of criticism that are not role oughts, my account gains important resources for 
explaining the apparent categoricity of doxastic oughts that Feldman’s account lacks. 
 Regarding Kornblith: Doxastic oughts do seem to me to derive from epistemic ideals, but 
not on the model of the derivation of typical moral ‘ought-to-do’s from moral ideals. This is 
because the lack of voluntary control we have over our beliefs is not the same sort of voluntary 
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control lacked by someone who, because she falls short of a moral ideal, is incapable of acting in 
the morally required ways. Even when we are epistemically ideal, we appear to lack direct 
voluntary control over our doxastic attitudes. So the possibility of being nonideal does not 
explain why the no rewards principle is true. By contrast, seeing doxastic oughts as epistemic 
rules of criticism does explain why the no rewards principle is true: Doxastic oughts are ‘ought-
to-be’s and we cannot directly decide to be this way or that. In this way, then, the epistemic 
ideals which underwrite doxastic oughts are analogous to moral ideals about appropriate 
feelings. For example, perhaps it follows from the moral ideal of generosity that one ought to 
feel pleasure when giving to charity. If so, this can be true even though one does not have direct 
voluntary control over whether one feels pleasure when giving to charity. Because one lacks 
direct voluntary control, it does not make sense to offer to reward someone to have this feeling 
just like it does not make sense to offer to reward someone for having a particular belief. 
Though, of course, we can sometimes decide to do something that makes us be this way or that, 
and it can sometimes make sense to reward someone to do perform one of these actions with 
indirect influence over our states of feeling or belief. None of this is inconsistent with 
Kornblith’s account of doxastic oughts as deriving from epistemic ideals, but it moves beyond 
that account by providing a way to understand the difference between oughts that apply to 
actions and oughts that apply to beliefs.50 The former are rules of action, while the latter are 
rules of criticism. 
 So my general idea is to treat doxastic oughts as rules of criticism that imply rules of 
action. Because rules of criticism are oughts which do not presuppose that their subjects have 
voluntary control over what is prescribed (or even that they can act at all), this explains why the 
no rewards principle is true, but since there are many clear examples of true rules of criticism, 
this helps to underwrite the true doxastic oughts principle. Now, although the connection I have 
claimed between doxastic oughts and rules of action rests heavily on the ceteris paribus clause 
and the notion of material implication (as it does for Sellars’ linguistic rules), I have claimed that 
doxastic rules of criticism imply rules of action. So it is fair to wonder: what rules of action are 
implied? I think this is a complex and difficult question that I do not hope to settle with any 
serious precision here. But I will conclude by gesturing at the kind of specifics I think are 
plausible and warning against one possible way of going that may seem to render the account 
trivial.  
 
5. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A FULLER ACCOUNT 
There is nothing about thinking of doxastic oughts as ‘ought-to-be’s that precludes their being 
categorical. Here Kornblith’s idea that epistemic oughts derive from epistemic ideals is helpful.51 
For example, it is plausible to think that people ought to feel outrage about genocide. With the 
distinction between rules of action and rules of criticism, this can be construed as a categorical 
rule of criticism deriving from a moral ideal of compassion and respect for persons. To be sure, 
it requires much reflection to identify epistemic ideals precisely. Much like our moral ideals 
                                                
50 It also makes sense of D. Owens’ claim in Reason without Freedom: The Problem of Epistemic 
Normativity (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 126, that “Some norms are not there to guide action, to 
govern the exercise of control: their function is to assess what we are.” Because he thinks this, Owens 
argues that not all responsibility presupposes freedom to choose—in particular, epistemic responsibility 
does not presuppose voluntary choice of our doxastic attitudes. I agree with this. However, I would say 
that epistemic responsibility is intimately related to responsibility to do things, over which we do have 
voluntary control. The conceptual connection between rules of criticism and rules of action that I have 
been urging allows one to make this connection. 
51 For similar ideas compare C. Hookway, “Cognitive Virtues and Epistemic Evaluations,” International 
Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2 (1994), p. 225; and L. Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 219-31. 
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come from our natures as social beings, I suspect that our epistemic ideals will come from our 
natures as information tracking and transmitting beings, which is tied up with out natures as 
social beings. It is part of instituting and maintaining the social structures in which these ideals 
are ideals that we evaluate and react not only to each other’s actions but also to each other’s 
ways of being. These evaluations and reactions help to shape the way we are and, since the way 
we are is intimately tied to the way we will act, also how we will act. In such a situation, I think 
there is good reason to suppose that the doxastic oughts that derive from the ideals of being 
good information tracking and transmitting beings will be categorical rules of criticism that 
imply inter-personal epistemic rules of action. 
There is one way to capture the categoricity of doxastic oughts which might seem to 
render the account I have sketched above trivial (even if correct). This can be brought into view 
by noticing that, although believing is a mental state and so not in the relevant sense an action, 
there is a very closely related mental act. This is the act of judging. This connection is 
highlighted and exploited by Shah and Velleman52 in their attempt to make sense of doxastic 
deliberation—that is, deliberation framed by the question whether or not to believe that p. They 
want to know how such deliberation can make sense from the perspective of doxastic 
involuntarism; and their suggestion is that doxastic deliberation is in the first instance 
deliberation about the mental act of judging. This they see as a species of the mental act of 
affirming a proposition. More specifically, it is the species of affirming a proposition, which is 
conceived of as subject to a particular norm of correctness, namely, the norm that the act is 
correct if and only if the proposition is true. In their view, this norm distinguishes judgment 
from other species of affirming, such as affirming a proposition for heuristic or polemical 
purposes, as a correlative norm of correctness distinguishes belief from other cognitive mental 
states, such as assuming and imagining. Shah and Velleman think this helps to avoid any 
problem doxastic involuntarism might be thought to cause for a coherent notion of doxastic 
deliberation. They write, 
Now, there can be no problem about the possibility of deliberating whether to perform 
the mental act of affirming that p. As an act, mental affirmation is clearly eligible to be 
an object of deliberation. A problem might be thought to arise in the transition from that 
act of affirmation to an affirmative attitude, but to our minds, there is no problem about 
that transition, either. Exactly how one accomplishes the transition is of course ineffable, 
but it is a perfectly familiar accomplishment, in which a proposition is occurrently 
presented as true in such a way as to stick in the mind, lastingly so represented.53 
So, in the idiom of rules of criticism and rules of action, the idea would be to treat doxastic 
oughts as ‘ought-to-be’s which imply ‘ought-to-do’s about which acts of judging the agent should 
perform. So, for example,  
You ought to believe that you are now reading this paper 
would be a rule of criticism implying the rule of action 
You ought to judge that you are now reading this paper. 
Although they do not stress this point, one potential advantage of Shah and Velleman’s 
view is that it can capture a sort of categoricity had by doxastic oughts that is not captured by the 
model of role oughts. This is because, in their view, it is part of the concept judging that an act’s 
being a judgment consists in part in its being subject to the specific norms of correctness 
relevant to judgments. By contrast, it is not part of the concept of, e.g., being a slave that one is 
subject to any particular norm of correctness, such as that one ought to serve without question. 
To see this, notice that one who does not aim to serve without question may still count as a 
                                                
52 Op. cit. 
53 Ibid., p. 503. 
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slave, whereas one who does not aim at the truth in affirming a proposition does not count as 
judging. This means that, insofar as one is judging, one is subject to the oughts that derive from 
the constitutive norms of correctness for judgment. The same is not generally true of role 
oughts; it is not the case that, insofar as one is a slave, one is subject to the constitutive norms of 
being a slave. 
 Although I think this line of thought provides a novel way to capture the categoricity of 
doxastic oughts, the account of doxastic oughts is too simple for the purposes of coming up with 
a satisfying account of doxastic oughts in light of the apparent tension between the no rewards 
principle and the true doxastic oughts principle. This is for two reasons. First, even if judging is 
a mental act, it is not clearly (or at least always) a voluntary action. The no rewards principle 
applies to acts of judging as much as it applies to states of believing. Offered a high reward to 
judge that the U.S. is still a colony of Britain, you cannot just do it and collect the reward. So, 
treating these acts as the place where deontological evaluation can get a proper foothold in 
epistemology will provide no respite from the no rewards principle. Second, we have already 
seen that an important difference between rules of criticism and rules of action is that the latter 
but not the former have as a precondition on their truth that the subject to whom they apply has 
the conceptual resources needed to follow the rule. Part of the theoretical value of rules of 
criticism is that they apply regardless of whether the subject to which they apply has the 
conceptual resources necessary to follow them (e.g. “The clock chimes ought to strike at the 
quarter hour.”) If, however, for every true doxastic ought of the form  
 S ought to believe p,  
we could derive a rule of action of the form  
 S ought to perform the mental act of judging that p, 
then it would be incorrect to treat people as subject to doxastic oughts unless they had the 
concepts of mental act and judging. Moreover, if Shah and Velleman are right about what is 
involved in the concept of judging, one would also have to have the concept of being subject to a 
norm of correctness. But this does not seem right. Some of the true doxastic oughts apply to 
believers who do not themselves (yet) have the necessary conceptual apparatus to follow the 
ostensibly correlative rule of action about the mental act of judging. Small children and even 
some animals ought to believe certain propositions even if they do not (yet) have the conceptual 
apparatus needed to follow a rule of action about the mental act of judging.  
 In the theoretical milieu of a debate between doxastic involuntarists and proponents of 
epistemic deontology, the principal advantage of the distinction between rules of action and 
rules of criticism is that it shows how there can be a species of rule, properly so called, which 
does not require its subject, no matter who or what it is, to be capable of voluntarily following it. 
So I think it we would be giving up on this theoretical advantage if we thought that every 
doxastic rule of criticism implied a correlative rule of action prescribing the action of judging.  
 This is partially why, in my view, we need a more inter-personal conception of the 
relationship between doxastic oughts and the implied rules of action. One way to get this is to 
think of doxastic oughts as including a forward-looking element that is akin to the Sellarsian 
conception of language instruction. For example, if you have a doxastic attitude that you ought 
not to have, I think it is plausible to suppose that members of your epistemic community ought 
(ceteris paribus) to do what is in their power to disabuse you of this doxastic attitude by, for 
example, providing you with counter-evidence, counter-arguments, and, at the extreme, 
institutional care. (Again, due to the ceteris paribus clause, this rule of action is often void in the 
very many cases where there are more important things to do). However, doxastic oughts can 
also be plausibly thought to include a backward-looking element. For example, when we say,  
 You ought to disbelieve that the earth is flat, 
it is plausible to suppose that this also implies both intra-personal rules of action such as  
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 You ought to have read your science books and listened to your parents and teachers 
and inter-personal rules of action such as  
 Your parents and teachers ought to have taught you that the earth is not flat. 
 To go this way is to interpret doxastic oughts as logically related to ‘ought-to-do’s on the 
existential view discussed above. If a doxastic ought is true, then there is someone who ought do 
to (or ought to have done) something. Here, I have suggested vaguely that it is the believer’s 
epistemic community (which might include his/her previous self) who is subject to this ought-
to-do. I’m inclined towards this interpretation, though it does raise the difficult question of why 
we should think people in epistemic communities are responsible for each other’s beliefs. I do 
not know of a completely satisfactory way to approach this question. However, it is important to 
notice that for my argumentative purposes in this paper, we could just as well go the other way 
and conceive of doxastic oughts as related to ‘ought-to-do’s on the conditional model discussed 
above. Perhaps doxastic oughts merely imply that, if someone is responsible for a particular 
believer’s beliefs about something, then that person ought to do what he/she can to bring it 
about that the believer believes correctly. This would still be a case of treating doxastic oughts as 
rules of criticism. And like other rules of criticism, the key point is that the subject to which they 
apply does not have to have direct voluntary control over the state which is prescribed in order 
for the ought to be true. This is why the no rewards principle holds even in the face of the true 
doxastic oughts principle. Also, like other rules of criticism, doxastic oughts imply rules of 
action, and it seems plausible to see them as categorical rather than hypothetical and as 
implying both forward-looking and backward-looking inter-personal rules of action. 
 
